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Criminal Law and the Man Problem 
by Ngaire Naffine. Oxford: Hart, 2019. 
 
Naffine’s Criminal Law and the Man Problem can be situated within a tradition of academic and legal 
texts that use gender ‘as an analytical tool to push at the boundaries of orthodox thinking.’1 The power 
and originality of Naffine’s analysis however, is found in her examination of ‘Men qua men, as the 
subjects and objects of criminal law…as a subset of the entire population…with a set of historical and 
modern sectional interests.’2 This approach adds an important dimension to feminist legal work that has 
used gender in all its different iterations to interrogate law3, exposed the hidden histories of women in 
the law4, or applied a feminist lens to legal judgments.5 Naffine examines the construction of the male 
legal subject within criminal legal history.6 The subject that she traces is bounded and sovereign: he is 
a rational, civilized member of a civil polity7, exercising control over his use of force and respectful of 
other (male) subjects’ boundaries and sovereignty.8 
Naffine shows how this sovereign, bounded subject can only be fully iterated through his relation with 
a non-bounded subject – women. She explores how the female subject of criminal law did (and arguably 
does) not enjoy the same sovereignty as her male counterpart: ‘the personal borders of men – the very 
bodies of men as understood by criminal law – were extended outwards annexing and colonising the 
body of the wife.’9 Iterated in legal history most clearly in coverture and repeated in multiple forms in 
the legal system, the female legal person is absorbed into that of the male.10 In exposing this 
interdependency and relationality, Naffine shows how different forms of subjectivity bring each other 
into view – women, and particularly wives, must assume complementary and dependent roles in order 
                                                          
1 Dianne Otto and Anna Grear, 'International Law, Social Change and Resistance: A Conversation Between Professor Anna 
Grear (Cardiff) and Professorial Fellow Dianne Otto (Melbourne)' (2018) 26 FLS 351, p359 
2 Ngaire Naffine, Criminal Law and the Man Problem (Oxford: Hart, 2019) p183 
3 Joanne Conaghan, Law and Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
4 Erika Rackley and Rosemary Auchmurty, Women's Legal Landmarks: Celebrating the history of women and law in the UK 
and Ireland (Oxford: Hart, 2018) 
5 See Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxofrd: Hart, 
2010) and the multiple Feminist Judgments texts that have followed this project.  
6 Naffine above n2 p4 
7 Ibid p35 
8 Ibid p32 
9 Ibid p81 
10 Ibid p82, p89 
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to maintain the coherence of the stable male subject. This coexisting legal visibility and invisibility is 
apparent throughout the book as Naffine explores different legal horizons in order to show the 
fundamental instability of man’s subjectivity in criminal law.11  
The ‘acid test’12 that brings all these elements into combination is rape law and specifically, the marital 
rape exception, which persisted until 1992 in England and Wales and Australia – key jurisdictions 
examined in the book. Naffine introduces the exemption in the first chapter through a detailed 
recounting of DPP v Morgan.13 Particularly clear in Naffine’s analysis is how little attention was paid 
by the court to the marital rape exemption – ‘an ancient common law doctrine’14 - despite its central 
role in ensuring that Morgan was only charged and convicted for abetting his wife’s rape, not the rape 
itself, thus allowing Morgan ‘to disappear from legal view, into the bedroom.15 This apparent blindness 
to the injustice of Morgan’s shielding from prosecution was further perpetuated by scholarly works 
discussing the case as it became a landmark not for the exemption – which was largely ignored16 – but 
for the principle that serious wrongs require a subjective mens rea.17 
Having discussed Morgan and its legal and academic aftermath, Naffine then historicises the case’s 
contradictions by exploring the work and writings of ‘influential legal men’18 from Hale (1609) to the 
20th century, most of whom - with notable exceptions - supported and justified the marital rape 
exemption and the unequal position of men and women in criminal law. In a close reading of the works 
of these men of law, Naffine points out the paradox of their position: crimes such as rape are endowed 
in these writings with a ‘pre-legal wrongfulness’19, that is, a crime from which we should refrain because 
it is wrong, not because it is illegal. Yet one person – the husband – is exempt from this requirement. 
By letting the ‘leading men of criminal law’20 speak for themselves across the centuries on this topic, 
                                                          
11 Ibid p76, p106 
12 Ibid p22, but note that Naffine is clear that a series of ‘satellite laws’, such as assault are also associated with the marital 
rape exemption.  
13 [1975] UKHL 3 
14 Halisham LJ, 14 in Naffine above n 2 p10 
15 Naffine above n 2 p11 
16 Ibid p7 
17 Ibid p18 
18 Ibid p3 
19 Duff in Ibid p21 
20 Ibid p3 
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Naffine exposes their hypocrisy. She shows how the exemption is justified by reference to (usually 
stereotypical or under researched) appeals to women’s and men’s ‘natures’ (which are taken to be 
complementary and diametrically opposed). In many of these works, a women ‘needs’ to be dominated 
and cared for: the ‘gentle violence’ required to ensure her sexual submission is viewed by thinkers and 
legislators as a marital good rather than a criminal offence.21 
Neither the legal limits of permissible violence, nor the legal and academic justifications for the marital 
rape exemption have remained static over time, but have shifted with prevailing social norms, while 
continuously preserving the central doctrine of a husband’s unrestricted access to his wife’s body. 
Within these shifting and contradictory arguments a clear view of the gendered relations of legal power 
emerges - one that, as Naffine notes, was apparent to thinkers such as JS Mill and Edward Christian, 
who wrote critically on the rape exemption and other unequal aspects of marriage in 18th and 19th 
centuries. In making men specifically visible within these gendered relations, Nafffine shows how 
specific masculine subjectivities and figurations are constructed within authoritative legal writings. 
These subjects, like the arguments that sustain them, also shift over time while appearing to remain 
constant – and as Naffine notes, these shifts and contradictions are the cause of considerable cognitive 
dissonance.22  
In the final section of the book, Naffine shows how historical contradictions have been carried through 
into the present. The marital rape exemption may have been removed, the subject of criminal law may 
be ostensibly gender free, but the history of men and women’s differential construction and treatment 
in criminal law has not been fully faced. The gender-free criminal legal subject is more often than not 
read as male – and once again, the woman disappears, or is unserved by criminal legal norms and 
practices.23 It is from this basis that Naffine issues an important challenge: to face this criminal legal 
                                                          
21 As explored in depth in relation to G v G [1924] AC 349 Ibid p91. However, when these naturalist justifications fail: 
particularly when law’s brutality is revealed, as in the case of R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 in which Clarence’s conviction 
for inflicting grievous bodily harm on his wife by transmission of gonorrhoea was overturned. Naffine shows how jurists and 
judges were willing to adopt a strict positivist stance rather than facing the contradictions inherent in the supposedly ‘natural’ 
legal position of men and women. This allowed the justification for immunity to remain a moving target dependent upon the 
legal horizon in view. 
22 Ibid p87, p136 
23 Eg Harriet Samuels, 'International Women’s Day 2019: In Conversation with Harriet Wistrich' (2019) 27 FLS 311, p315; 
Emma Milne, 'Concealment of Birth: Time to Repeal a 200-Year-Old “Convenient Stop-Gap”?' (2019) 27 FLS 139; H. 
Douglas, 'Battered Women’s Experiences of the Criminal Justice System: Decentring the Law' (2012) 20 FLS 121; Silvana 
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history and make visible both the historic injustices faced by women and the sectional interests that 
have created the male criminal legal subject in their own interests. This must be done not by fudging or 
denying the past24, or in a piecemeal fashion, but through a recognition of the extent of a systemic and 
sustained system of violence and violation. This story, she notes ‘continues to unfold’.25  
Naffine’s challenge is far reaching, but it is sustained by the book’s tightly focused argument. This 
focus is both a source of strength and a potential weakness, or at least a point of departure for further 
consideration of the ramifications of Naffine’s analysis of ‘the man problem’. In particular, the tight 
focus on the marital rape exemption, as theorised by influential legal thinkers, leaves open the question 
of how the law constructed and regulated men outside of criminal law. It would be useful, for example, 
to consider how these gendered subjectivities existed or were activated in other legal fields – such as 
property or family law.26  
Equally, it would be useful to consider how criminal law regulated those men who did not align with 
the bounded, civilised subject that emerged as these legal thinkers’ own image. For example, the male, 
subject that Naffine identifies might be usefully contrasted with criminal legal approaches to and 
figurations of men who upset law’s gendered relations and by men who were, at various points in 
criminal legal history configured as ‘uncivilized’.27 Gay, bisexual and queer men as well as gender non-
conforming men and women have experienced a very different relationship with criminal law - and 
indeed, Naffine briefly mentions the way in which criminal law has undermined the personal 
sovereignty of millions of homosexual men, in a similar fashion to its undermining the personal 
sovereignty of women.28 This brief comment exposes the multiple ways in which law’s gendered 
subjects and ‘criminal legal principles imbued with misogyny and homophobia’29 expands far beyond 
                                                          
Tapia Tapia, 'Feminism and Penal Expansion: The Role of Rights-Based Criminal Law in Post-Neoliberal Ecuador' (2018) 26 
FLS 285; Mimi E. Kim, 'Anti-Carceral Feminism: The Contradictions of Progress and the Possibilities of Counter-Hegemonic 
Struggle' (2019) Affilia 1Beth E. Richie and Kayla M. Martensen, 'Resisting Carcerality, Embracing Abolition: Implications 
for Feminist Social Work Practice' (2020) 35 Affilia 12  
24 Naffine above n 5, p121, p136  
25 Ibid p187 
26 Eg Kate Galloway, 'The Role of Pateman’s Sexual Contract in Beneficial Interests in Property' (2019) 27 FLS 263  
27 There is also space here to consider women who challenged regimes of gender or civilization, although this is less central 
to the focus on the male criminal legal subject.  
28 Naffine above n 2 p145-6 
29 Ibid p146 
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just the question of historical marital rape immunity. Indeed, as Naffine notes, strict public/private 
divisions did much to hide the violence of husbands from criminal legal scrutiny, but those men who 
strayed from the gendered figurations of masculinity contained within criminal law could not expect 
the same protections – and had to litigate over an extended period in various jurisdictions to acquire 
them.30 Part of meeting Naffine’s challenge to recognise the violence of the criminal legal past should 
be to bring these stories into view.31 
Implicit in Naffine’s analysis throughout the book is the relationship between male personal sovereignty 
and concepts of statehood, civilisation and national identity. A kind of ‘statecraft as mancraft’32 
underpins the writings of the men of law – whether it be through a consideration of the concept of 
civilisation by Norbert Elias33 or through the Australian High Court’s reworking of legal history to 
portray South Australia as a ‘progressive state in a progressive nation’, despite evidence to the contrary 
in a case of historical marital rape.34 For all the emphasis placed by men of law on bounded sovereign 
subjectivity, as Naffine notes, no subjects are isolated, and all are integrated into wider systems of 
gendered, state, and institutional power. In this respect, it is notable that many of the texts Naffine 
considers were written during the colonial era or its immediate aftermath.35 An interesting consideration 
here would therefore be the influence of Britain’s imperial rage for order36 on the development of 
criminal legal thinking. Not only were British colonies zones of experimentation for the development 
of penal codes37, but more generally and significantly for the arguments developed in the book, the 
colonial era was marked by an civilized/uncivilized binary in which the supposedly civilized or brutal 
behaviour of colonized men became the motivation for the ‘civilizing mission’ of imperial control.38 
                                                          
30 Dudgeon v UK (1981) 3 EHRR 40, Toonen v. Australia, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), 4 
April 1994 
31 See for example the work of Queer Beyond London http://queerbeyondlondon.com/about/ 
32 Cynthia Weber, Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) p6 
33 Naffine above n 2 p35 
34 Ibid p123 
35 Ibid p59 
36 Lauren  Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800–1850 
(Harvard University Press 2016) 
37 Michael Kirby, 'The sodomy offence: England’s least lovely criminal law export?' in Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites 
(eds), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in The Commonwealth: Struggles for Decriminalisation and 
Change (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 2013), p65 
38 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 
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From a perspective of the ‘civilized’ subject therefore, women were not the only ‘other’ against which 
the male subject of law was constructed.     
Moreover, the ideas of civilization that underpinned male bounded subjectivity and sovereignty have 
not remained static.39 Naffine highlights this contradiction throughout: the male subject of law is 
assumed to be timeless and fixed, even when shifting norms and conceptions of acceptable violence are 
in flux, creating concurrent shifts in legal subjectivities and criminal legal figurations. An important 
part of responding to Naffine’s call to face criminal legal history’s violence might thus be facing the 
ongoing impact of empire, and the way in which imperially created subjectivities continue to animate 
binaries of self and other, in a way that still disproportionately criminalises and polices those who do 
not resemble the white, elite, educated men of law.40  
Naffine’s focus on the ‘demographically restricted community’41 of male thinkers and jurists 
historically and into the 20th century offers powerful support for arguments in favour of widening 
participation in the judiciary the academy and the criminal legal system. It also raises a question: Naffine 
is right to note that these men were extremely influential, but – as the book shows – no subject or thinker 
operates in isolation. There is space here to further consider how patriarchal thought was maintained by 
an entire architecture – that extended from social norms, to policing and forms of regulation, to the 
judiciary and the legal system in its entirety. Part of meeting Naffine’s challenge to fully face the 
violence of legal history faced by women, might be to face its expansion beyond the elites and their 
legal texts, and to explore how law’s failure to acknowledge its own violence contributes to the 
persistence of gendered stereotypes and subjectivities more generally.  
Criminal Law and the Man Problem is a powerful and provocative addition to literatures of criminal 
legal history, gender and the law and critical approaches to criminal law. It can function as a valuable 
teaching tool, with accessibly written chapters that might be used to encourage students to think 
critically about the histories and practices of ostensibly neutral criminal legal systems. Equally 
                                                          
39 Naffine above n 2 p30 
40 In an immigration law context see Nadine El-Enany, Bordering Britain: Law, Race and Empire (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 2020) see also Patrick Williams and Becky Clarke, 'The Black Criminal Other as an Object of Social Control' 
(2018) 7 Social Sciences 1  
41 Naffine above n 2 p139 
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important however, is the book’s call to action: it reminds us that ‘the man problem’ is unresolved and 
that our task must be to continue the unfolding story by which the deficiencies of the ‘default man’42 
that animates the criminal legal subject are exposed, challenged and remedied.  
 
 
                                                          
42 Ibid 187 
